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If only the Iraqi insurgents and
their masters from other regional regions had been clever. If only,
then they could have conquered Iraq easily by now. It could have
been so easy for them and so easy for the US coalition. |
| If,
after the fall of Baghdad in April, 2003, the insurgency would have
paused, the US coalition would have celebrated its win, repaired and
built up Iraq's infrastructure and oil industry, and left Iraq. Aid
money would have poured in from the US, European and Asian nations
seeking to do business with new Iraq. |
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After perhaps a year, Iraq would
have reaped massive benefits. All the world, along with the majority
of the Iraqi people would be settling in to a profitable and
somewhat secure routine within a year. |
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Civil people would be going about
their business in Iraq and the world would be turning toward other
problems. |
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Then, suddenly, in that relatively
relaxed atmosphere, the insurgency could easily erupt. It could have
used that year-long period of pause to group, train, organize,
develop a plan, and erupt. |
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Why did the insurgency of the
Middle East not pause? Could it be so lacking in leadership, angry,
engulfed in fanaticism, vengeful and fired up by self-serving
foreign fanaticism that it could not pause to plan? |
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Or do the insurgents actually have
no ability to plan anything more complex than planting road side
IEDs and flying passenger airplanes into buildings? |
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Even today -- if the insurgency
were able -- it could implement this plan and reach its purported
objectives of destruction and disruption. |
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